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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
-vs-
BRYON DALE PETERSON, 
Defendant-Appellant 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
No. 18298 
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF THE CASE 
'~: This i·s a crirntnal proceeding brought by the State of·.Utah against 
Bryon Dale Peterson charging him with having committed one count of Aggravated 
Burglary in vi o 1 ati on of Section 76-6-.203, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as 
amended and two counts of Aggravated Assault in violation of Section 76-5-103 
Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
After a jury trial on December 21 and 22, 1981 in the District 
Court in and for Carbon County, State of Utah, the defendant was found guilty 
of Aggravated Burglary, Aggravated Assault and Assault. The court pronounced 
judgment on January 18, 1982 and sentenced the defendant to be imprisoned in 
the Utah State Prison- for 5 years to life for Aggravated Burglary, together 
with a $10,000 fine, 0-5 years for Aggravated Assault and 0-6 months in the 
Carbon County jail for Assault. 
-1-
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks an order of this Court reversing the judgment. 
rendered at the trial and a ruling remanding the cause to the trial court 
for a new trial. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On November 16, 1981, the defendant was arraigned on two counts 
of Aggravated Assault and a jury trial was set for December 21, 1981. On 
Thursday, December 17, 1981, the Hon. Don V. Tibbs, Vi-siting Judge from 
the Sixth Judicial District of the State of Utah, phoned counsel for the 
defendant (T.5) and advised him that a Motion for Joinder had just been 
filed that day by the State of Utah. (Record at p.32) The Motion sought 
to join one Count of Aggravated Burglary from a separate Information with 
the two counts of Aggravated Assault which were to be tried on December 21, 
1981. Counsel for defendant expressed his oral objection to the Court and 
filed an Objection to Motion for Joinder on December lR,1981. (Record at 
p.35). On the morning of trial the Court granted the Motion for Joinder. 
(T.5). 
The defendant was then tried for the offense of having burglarized 
the dwelling of Sandra Dotson at approximately 6:20-6:30 A.M. on September 1, 
1981, and committing an Aggravated Assault on Sandra Dotson and Tammy Dotson 
while in the home. 
The testimony of witnesses called by the prosecution showed that 
Sandra Dotson had a broken leg and was sleeping on the couch in the living 
room of her home on September l, 1981 when she awakened at approximately 
-2-
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6:30 A.M. She saw a· bald head coming through the doorway of the kitchen 
( T. ll -13) , and at fi rs·t thought it was her boy friend, Joe Gross, who 
had done "things·like that before" and who was bald.(T. 12, ?8) She also 
thought it might be.her ex-~usband, Walter Dotson(T.15,33) The.man then 
sat on her and placed his hands around her throat and struck her in the 
face (T.15, 16) .. She responded by slapping, scratching the assailant, 
and screaming for her 14 year old daughter, Tammy, who was sleeping in 
the basement bedroom. ·(T .18) She then drifted in and out of consc.i ousness . 
several times. (T. 18, 19). 
Tammy Dotson testified that she was awakened at 6:30 A.M. by 
her ·alarm clock and then heard a scream from her mother. She immediately 
went upstairs and looked into the living room where she saw someon~ on 
top of her mother and assumed it was her mother's boy friend. (T.44, 54) 
The assaJlant then grabbed Tammy's wrist and started to choke her .. She 
apparently went unconscious momentarily and when she awakened she saw 
the assail ant· choking and beating her mother. (T.47) Tammy then ran next 
door to the home of Edward McKinney who then ran to the Dotson ·home. 
(T.49, 51) 
Edward McKtnney testified that.upon enterin~ the Dotson living 
room he saw someone-bent over Sandy. (T.90) The assailant then walked 
past Mr. McKinney and left the home. (T.93) 
Richard Rathers testified that shortly after 6~00 A.M. on 
September 1, 1981 he was in his home across the street from the Dotson 
home when he heard screams .. (T.99) He went outside, apparently saw 
Tammy Dotson running to the McKinney home (T.100) and then saw someone 
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coming up the driveway of the Dotson home and get into an orange Dodge 
van and drive away. (TJOl-103) He wrote down the license number of the 
van and later gave it to the police. (T.104, 105) 
Price City Police went to the home of the defendant in Price 
at approximately 7:00 A.M. and requested that he go to the Sheriff's 
Office with them (T.83) where he was placed under arrest. 
' The defendant claimed the defense of mistaken identity and 
called an alibi witness, Mr. Charles Peterson, father of the defendant; 
who testified that the defendant arrived home at 5:30 A.M. on September 1, 
1981 and went to bed. (T. 150, 155) and was there at 6:00 A.M. fT.160) 
Officer Ed Shook testified that the license number of the vehicle seen 
leaving the Dotson home did not correspond to the license number of the 
defendant's vehicle, Marilyn McKinney also testified that the van seen 
leaving the Dotson home had a yellow fender on driver's side.(T. 174) 
State's Exhibits No. 2 and 3 which are photos of the Peterson van, 
revealed that defendant's vehicle does not have a yellow front fend~r. 
POINTS ON APPEAL 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING PLAINTIFF 1 S MOTION FOR JOINDER. 
On themorning of the first day of trial the Court granted the 
State's Motion to join one count of Aggravated Burglary with the two counts 
of Aggravated Assault. The defendant contends that the joinder of the 
offenses.was improper for th~ reason that the joinder did not afford the 
defendant adequate time to properly prepare a defense to a new information 
-4-
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containing the charge of Aggravated Burglary. The motion for joinder. 
was filed on Thursday,·December 17, 1981, four days before the trial 
was to begin on December 21, 1981. It is also significant to note that 
there was a weekend between the above two dates. 
The chronology of events is important to defendant's contention 
and is set out as follows: 
·, 
(A) Orginally two counts of Aggravated Assault and one count 
of Aggravated Burglary were filed with the Circuit Court in one 
Information and a Preliminary Hearing was held on November 9, 
1981. ·At that time the Court dismissed the charge of Aggravated 
Burglary and bound the defendant over to the District Court on 
·two charges of Aggravated Assault. 
(B) The ~efendant was then arraigned .tn the District Court on 
the two~charges of Aggravated Assault·on November 16,1981, and 
trial was set to a jury for December 21, l 98l. 
(C) On November 30, 1981, the State of Utah, without notifying 
defendant's counsel that a new information had been filed, did 
·in fact file a new informaUon in the Circuit Court charging 
defendant with the offense of Aggravated Burglary. 
( D) Counsel for defendant did not see the new· Information nor 
did he know -0f its existence until shortly before th€ defendant 
was arraigned on the charge of Aggravated Burglary in the 
Circuit Court on December 16, 1981. At that time the defendant 
objected in Circuit Court .to a Preliminary being held on that 
-5-
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day since neither the defendant nor his counsel were aware 
that the Preliminary Hearing would take place on that day. 
The circuit Court overruled defendant's objection and ordered 
that Preliminary Hearing go forward immediately. 
(£} On Thursday, December 17, 1981, counsel for defendant 
received a telephone call from the Honorable Don V. Tibbs, 
Visiting Judge of Sixth Judicial .District for the State of Utah, 
who advised defense counsel that the State had"just.filed a 
Motion to join the new Information containing the Aggravated. 
Burglary charge with the Information containing the two·. counts 
of Aggravated Assault. (Record at p.32) (T.5) The Court further 
informed counsel that he felt inclined to grant the motion.(T.249} 
The defendant then filed his Objection to PJaintiff's Motion For 
Joinder on December 18, 1981. (Record at p. 35) On Monday, 
Decer.iber 21, 1981 the Court granted the State.'s Motion for Joinder 
(T. 5) 
The material portions of Section 77-35-9, Utah Code Annotated 
1953, as amended provide as follows: 
(a) Two or more offenses may be charged in the same indictment 
or information in a separate count for each offense if the offense 
charged arise out of a criminal episode as defined in section 
76-1-401 .... 
(c) The court may order two or more indictments or informations 
or both to be tried together if the offenses, and the defendants, 
if there is more than one, could have been joined in a single 
indictment or information. The procedure shall be the same as if 
the prosecustion were under such single indictment or information. 
-6-
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· .(d~· .If it ap~e~rs that a defendant or the prosecution is· 
preJudiced by a Joinder of offenses or defendants in an indict-
ment or information, or by a joinder for trial together, the 
court shall order an election of separate trials of separate 
cou~ts, or.gra~t a sev~rance of defe~d~nt, or §rovide such other 
relief as Justice requires. (Underl1ning adde for emphasis) 
A defendant's right to severance of offenses or defendants 
. is.waived if the motion is not made at least five days before 
trial.. In ruling on a motion by defendant ·for severance, the· 
Court may order th~ prosecutor to disclose any statements made 
by the defendants which he intends to introduce in evidence-at 
the trial. · · 
By joining the two informations.the defendant was prejudiced 
by being prevented from consulting with his counsel on the new information 
prior to the time of trial and from assisting in the preparation of a 
proper defense. The joinder also effectively prevented the defendant 
from engaging in any discovery proceed.i''ngs which are available under 
Section 77-35-16, Utah Code~Annotated 1953, as amended. 
Although~ the offenses contained in both information alleged that 
·they occurred on the· ·same date, the nature of the defenses are indeed 
substantially different and contain different elements~ Primarily, the 
offense of aggravated burglary requires that there be an unlawful entry 
or that the ·defendant remain unlawfully on the premises, Section 76-6-202(1) 
Utah Code Annotated 195.3, as amended. By the time defendant 1 s co.unse 1 
was aware that the charge of aggravated burglary was .to be joined, witnesses 
had already been· called, and it was too late at that point to investigate 
and subpoena witnesses with regard to-whether the alleged entry into the 
home was illegal or with consent. The Court should also be aware that the 
defendant/ between December 17, _1981 and the date of tri a 1 on December 21 , 
198l~was incarcerated in the Utah State Prison, a.distance of 120 miles 
-7-
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from his counsel's office and was not reasonably available so that these 
issues could be discussed. The short period of time further prevented 
proper association between defendant and his counsel as to how the case 
should now be approached and what tactics might need to be changed in 
view of the fact that a new offense was being joined which contained 
different elements. 
·in State v. Mathis, 319 P.2d 134 (Utah 1957) the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah addressed itself·to the need for both sides to have 
a fair opportunity to prepare: 
The law is, or at least those who devote their lives to it 
like to think it is, the embodiment of reason and good sense. 
The duty of the court in administering justice carries deeper 
responsibilities than presiding over a game of tricks ... 
Experience teaches that in the arranging of trials and the-
marshaling of witnesses, sometimes either the prosecution or 
the defense may inadvertently find itself unable safely to 
proceed to trial. While diligence in preparation should be 
insisted upon, the courts necessarily must be somewhat indul-
gent of perplexing situations which arise, to the end that 
both sides have a fair opportunity to present.their respective 
cases . (31 9 P . 2 d at l 36 ) 
Section 77-35-9(d) provides as follows: 
11 
••• a defendant's right to severence of offenses or 
defendants is waived if the motion is not made at least 
five days before trial. 11 
The above sta~utory provision provides that a defendant can make 
a motion to severence of offenses if he does it at least five days prior 
to the trial. Yet, in this instance, the prosecution made a motion to 
join only four days prior to the time the trial was to commence and there 
was an intervening weekend. 
-8-
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It would seem that the State ought to be prohibited from making 
such a motion upon ·only four days notice when a defendant is bound by a 
five day notice period. 
By way of summary, the aggravated burglary was dismissed by the 
Circuit Court on November 9, 1981 and the prosecution did not formally 
move to have the matter reheard by the Circuit Court until December 16, 
1981, a period of five days-prior to the trial. 
-it woula appear that the State could have moved much more quickly 
on the new· information had it so desired and not forced the· defendant to 
be in the posision of determining four days prior to trial how it was going 
to not contend with a new charge which contained different offenses. 
- By opposing the Motion for Joi nder defense counsel was in effect 
claiming that he did not have sufficient time to prepare for trial. The 
Utah Supreme Court in discussing continuances stated·in State v. Moosman, 
542 P.2d. 1093 (1975): 
The grant~ng of a continuance of a case is a matter resting 
in the sound di~cretion of the trial judge, and that discretion 
wi 11 not be interfered with on appea 1 except where. the court 
~learly abused its discretion in the matter. (542 P.2d at 1094) 
Defendant asserts that the Court abused its discretion in this 
matter by ordering t~at the two information be joined in light of ~he 
particular circumstances. 
-9-
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POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO FORMALLY ARRAIGN THE 
DEFENDANT ON THE CHARGE OF AGGRAVATED BURGLARY. 
The.Court granted the State's Motion to join· the charge 
of Aggravated Burglary with the two counts of Aggravated Assault on 
the morning of the first day of the trial. The Court then proceeded 
with the trial without ever arraigning the defendant on the charge of 
Aggravated Burglary. It did not occur to counsel until a recess in 
the trial ·that the defendant had not been formally arraigned on the 
charge contained in the new information. (T.119) The Court, in hearing 
a Motion for New Trial,_ acknowledged that no formal arraignment had 
occurred: 
THE COURT: Counsel, I mean--of course, I mean it really 
stunned me when I read your brief that there was no formal 
arraignment. Of course, I was a visiting Judge at this point 
and I had assumed he'd been arraigned on that second count. 
You advised me before and I might have even arraigned him 
on the first count, I don't remember, but I don't think so, 
though, (T. 240) 
Section 77-35-lO(a) provides as follows: 
Upon the return of an indictment or upon receipt of the 
records from the magistrate following a bind-over, the 
defendant shall forthwith be arraigned in the district court. 
Arraignment shall be conducted in open court and shall con-
sist of reading the indictment or information to the defendant 
or stating to him the substance of the charge and calling on 
him to plead thereto. He shall be given a copy of the in-
dictment or information before he is called upon to plead. 
The language of the above statute appears to be mandatory ·in 
nature and requires that a formal arraignment be conducted in open court, 
that the information be read to the defendant or that the substance of 
-10-
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the charge be stated to him, that he be called upon to plead, and 
that he be furnished with a copy of the information. All of the fore-
going were inadvertenely not complied with,-undoubtedly because of the 
confusion and time constrairits resulting from the Court's Order for 
Joi nder. 
The failure to arraign prejudiced the defendant by depriving 
him of certain rights which accrue only at or soon after the time of 
arraignment, e.g., the right to challenge the sufficiency of the complaint 
together with the right to make such motions prior to,trial·as would be 
appropriate, including, but not limited to, motion for discovery pursuant 
to section 77-35-16. motion for bill of particulars, possible mqtion for 
suppression of evidence, and right to request sufficient time to prepare 
for trial after arraignment. 
Defendant further submits that the arraignment, particularly in 
a situtation such as this where a trial is held four days after the pre-
1 iminary hearing,-is a critical stage of the proceedings and should not 
be subject to waiver. In the alternative, if it is a proceeding subject 
to waiver, defendant asserts that it is incumbent upon the Court to advise 
the defendant of the attendant rights he would be waiving. The burden 
should be on the Court- to properly arraign defendant. The defendant. 
should not be placed in the position of having to request that his rights 
supposedly conferred by Section 77-35- lO(a) be afforded him. To suggest 
that the burden should be shifted to the defendant to demand fundamental 
rights ~oes not comport wit~ due process. 
-11-
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POINT II I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE PROSECUTION WOULD BE 
PERMITTED TO REBUT DEFENDANT'S ALIBI WITNESSES. 
The defendant~timely filed with the Court and served on the 
prosecuting attorney .his notice of alibi. (Record at p. 13). The State· 
filed no list of witnesses whom they intended to call to contradict·or 
impeach the defendant's alibi evidence. 
Section 77-14-2 Utah Code Annotated 1953 as amended provides 
as follows: 
(1) A defendant, whether or not written demand has been 
made, who intends ·to offer evidence of an alibi shall, 
not less than ten days before trial or at such other 
time as the court may allow, file and serve on the 
prosecuting attorney at nottce, in writing, of his 
intention to claim alibi. The notice shall contain 
specific information as to the place where the defendant 
claims to have been at the time of the alleged offense 
and, as particularly as is known to the defendant or 
his attorney, the names and addresses of the witnesses by 
whom he proposes to establish alibi. The prosecuting 
attorney, not more than five days after receipt of the list 
provided herein or at such other time as the court may 
direct, shall file and serve the defendant with the 
addresses, as particularly as are known to him, or the 
witnesses the state proposes to offer to contradi~t or 
impeach the defendant•s·alibi evidence. (underlining added) 
(2) The defendant and prosecuting attorney shall be under 
a continuing duty to disclose the names and addresses of 
additional witnesses which come to the attention of either 
party after filing their alibi witness lists. 
(3) If a defendant or prosecuting attorney fails to comply 
with ·the requirements of this section, the court may exclude 
evidence offered to establish or rebut alibi. However, the 
·defendant may always testify on his own behalf concerning 
a 1 i bi . 
(4) The court may, for good cause shown, waive the require-
ments of this section. 
-12-
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Counsel for defendant advised the court in chambers that he 
intended to call Mrs. LaVon Seely as an alibi witness. (T.169) Counsel 
for the State then advised the Court that he wanted to call Officer 
Dean Holdaway as a witness to rebut Mrs. Seely even though he had not 
complied wHh the statute in furnishing defense· counsel with a- list 
of the State's impeachment witnesses. (T.170). The court, after 
- listening to both sides, decided -that it would permit Officer Holdaway 
to rebut Mrs. Se~ly.(T.172) 
Defendant ~ontends that the trial court's ruling w~s an abuse 
of discretion in that· the State did not show or demonstrate to the Court 
"good cause" to waive the requirements of the statute. The only reason 
given by the State was that they weren 11 t sure Mrs. Seely was the person 
who made a statement to Officer Holdaway. It is of utmost importance, 
how-ever;' ·tff note that the State received defendant 1 s alibi notice con-
taining Mrs. Seely's name approximately 13-14 days prior to trial. The 
purpose of the notice by defense counsel was to afford the State the 
opportunity to· evaluate and prepare for Mrs. Seely'~ testimony. The 
State could offer- no credible reason to explain its failure to file its 
rebuttal witness list. 
The Court reasoned as follows; 
THE COURT: Counsel, the ···statute .also makes it discretionary· 
to the Court based upon the circumstances of the case. My 
position is this: This man, this rebuttal witness, is an 
officer that has testified both at the Preliminary Hearing 
and has heretofore testified to this Court about this matter. 
I don't see where that causes any hann under these circumstances. 
I mean you would bo~h have had an opportunity to cross-exam~ne 
him before about this whole matter. You could have asked him 
anything you wanted and I don't see where that falls into 
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this type of category of surprise. Anyway I don't want to 
argue about it, that's the ruling so I'm going to allow 
that. So, of course, if she's lying, I don't see how 
there's a rebuttal situation. (T.172) 
The Court in its reasoning, however, fails to take into con-
sideration the :fact that defense counsel did not know at the Preliminary 
Hearing that the officer had any information to rebut the contention of 
Mrs. Seely. Defense counsel would have had no reason to cross-examine 
·Officer Holdaway on that issue at Preliminary Hearing. 
Mrs. Seely's testimony would have been that she was sleeping 
in the living room of the Peterson home when the defendant arrived home, 
that she saw him come in the ftont door and go to the kitchen and then 
go to his bedroom. (T. 169) The ruling of the Court permitting the 
officer to rebut her testimony at the 1 ast moment caused a chi 11 i ng effect 
on her and she did not testify. The practical result was that the 
defendant was deprived of a witness who would corroborate the alibi 
testimony of Mr. Charles Peterson. 
In Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S.470, 93 S.Ct. 2208, 37L.Ed2d 82(1973) 
The United States Supreme Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment forbids 
enforcement of "alibi rules unles reciprocal rights are given to criminal 
defendants' (412 U.S. at 472, 93 S.Ct. at 2211) The Utah Supreme Court 
in Gentry v. Smith, 600 P.2_d 1008(1979) emphasized the fact: 
11 
••• the State may not insist that trials be run as a 
'search for truth' so far as defense witnesses are concerned, 
while maintaining 'poker game' secrecy for its own witnesses." 
See also State v. Haddenham 585 P.2d 447 (1978) and State v. 
Case 547 P. 2d 221 (1976) 
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POINT IV 
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO GRANT DEFENDANT 1 S MOTION ... FOR 
NEW TRIAL UPON THE GROUNDS THAT THE STATE ASKED A WITNESS AN IMPROPER 
QUESTION. 
Counsel for .Defendant called Evan Reid as a witness on behalf· 
of the defendant. On cross-examination the prosecutor asked.'the question 
twice, 11 Are you Bryon Peterson 1 s parole offi cer 11 • (T. 161 , 180). The 
State continued to pursue Mr. Reid's employment and was finally told by 
the Court ·to not get into that area. (T. 181). 
The quest.ton propounded by the State is by its very nature 
"loaded" and· impl i.es-:that the defendant has been convicted of a crime~ 
. Evidence of the defendant's conviction of a crime is not 
admissible at trial unless the defendant'himself takes the witness stand 
and responds to the quest ion, .11 Have you been convicted of a fe l ony? 11 
Rule 21 of the Utah Rules of Evidence provides: 
Evidence.of the conviction of a witness for a crime 
not i nvo l vi ng :dishonesty or false statement s ha 11 be 
inadmissible for the purpose of impairing his credibility ... 
The- defendant in.,.this case did not take the witness stand for 
the reason that he had been previously convicted of a felony. Neverthe-
1 es·s, the prosecution deliberately attempted to circumvent the defendant 1 s 
rights in this regard by propounding the question 11 Are you the defendant's 
parole officer?'' Certainly such a question carries significant weight 
with the jury and unduly influences their minds and prejudices them against 
the defendant. Additionally, there wasno method of undoing the damage 
done by the Prosecutor 1 s question. ·""'· · · 
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Defendant filed a Motion for New Trial and cited the above 
impropriety as a cause for new trial. (Record at P. 108) · Th&motion 
was denied by the Court.(T.254) 
The instant case is distinguishable from State v. Case, 547 
P.2d 221 (1976) wherein the Utah Supreme Court held that reference in 
the testimony to the Fact that defendant had been incarcerated fo the 
Utah State Prison -was not ground for a mis tri a 1 . In Case the reference 
to the prison was the result of an unintentional slip of the tongue 
whereas the question prosed inthe present c_a_s_ewas a deliberate and 
intentional attempt to discredit the defendant's character when it 
wasn't in issue. 
states: 
Section 77-35-24(a) Utah Gode Annotated 1953,. as amended 
The court may, upon motion of a party or upon its own ~ 
initiative, grant a new trial in the interest of justice 
if there is any error or impropriety which had a substantial 
adverse effect upon the rights of a party. 
Defendant suggests that the question propounded falls into 
the category of improprieties contemplated by the statute. Certainly 
it had a substantial adverse effect upon the rights of the defendant 
POINT V 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO GRANT DEFENDANT'S MOTION 
TO RULE AS A MATTER OF LAW THAT THE BURGLARY AND ASSAULTS WERE ijQT 
AGGRAVATED. 
Immediately after the prosecution rested its case the defense 
moved the Court to strike the word "aggravated" from each of the three 
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counts contained in the Information. (T. 116) The Court denied the 
Motion. ( T. 119) The jury returned a verdict of guilty to Aggravated 
Burglary and Aggravated Assault on Sandra Dotson and guilty of Assault 
(without the 11 Aggravated 11 ) on Tammy Dotson. Accordingly, this Appeal 
speaks only to verdicts of guilty to Aggravated Burglary and one count· 
of Aggravated Assault on Sandra Dotson. 
76-1-601: 
Section 76-5-103 defines Aggravated Assault as follows: 
A person commits aggravated assault if he commits 
assault as defined in Section 76-5-102 and: 
(a) He in-tentionally·causes serious bodily injury to 
another; or 
(b) He uses a deadly weapon or such means of force likely 
to produce death or serious bodily injury. 
The phrase "serious bodily injury" is defined in Section 
(9) "Serious bodily inJury 11 means bodily injury· that creates 
or causes serious permanent disfigurement, protracted loss 
6r impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ 
or creates a substantial risk of death. 
The testimony of Sandra Dotson makes it clear th~t she did not 
suffer any\serious bodily injury. She did not require any m~dical 
attention after the assault· and refused to go to the hospital. (T. 31, 
-
38, 39) Sandra also make no claim that any kind of a deadly weapon was 
used. There is also no evid~nce that she suffered any permanent dis-
figurement or protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily 
member or organ, nor did her bodily injury create a substantial risk of 
death. 
In State of Utah in the Interest of William N. Besendorfer, 568 
P.2d 742(1977·-uta~) the Utah Supreme Court agreed with the defendants 
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contention that an aggravated assault. had not been committed where the 
victim had been kicked in the legs, struck in the face several times by 
a fist and required ·dental attention for hi~ teeth~ 
The record in the instant case does not reveal that·Sandra 
Dotson received any injuries which were more serious than that sustained 
by the victim ·in Besendorfer. The record is also void Of direct evidence 
which would show the defendant used force or means likely to produce death 
or serious bodily injury. 
Addressing now the issue of whether an Aggravated Burglary was 
committed, defendant contends it was not as a matter of law in that 
"physical injury", as contemplated by Section 76-6-203(1 )(a) was not 
committed. Aggravated Burglary is defined by that section as follows: 
A person is guilty of aggravated burglary if in attempting, 
committing, or fleeing from a burglary, the actor or another 
pa-rticipant in the crime: 
(a) causes physical injury to any person who is not a 
participant in the crime; or 
(b) Uses or threatens the immediate use of a dangerous 
or deadly weapon against any person who is not a participant 
in the crime; or 
(c) Is armed with a deadly weapon or possesses or 
attempts to use any explosive or deadly weapon. 
The phrase 11 physical i njury 11 is not defined in the Utah 
Criminal Code and defendant submits that the small bruises and cuts 
sustained by Sandra and Tammy Dotson were not sufficient in magnitude 
to constitute the type of 11 physical injury" contemplated by the statute. 
The term. 11 physical injury" is sufficiently vague so as to make it unclear 
as to the degree of seriousness of injury deemed necessary by the 
legislature to constitute Aggravated Burglary. Accordingly, defendant 
also contends the statute is void for vagueness. 
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POINT VI 
THE IMPOSITION OF A $10,000.00 FINE WAS EXCESSIVE AND AN 
ABUSE OF THE TRIAL COURT'S DISCRETION 
For the offense of Aggravated Burglary the Court imposed a 
prison term from 5 years to life with a $10,000 fine. Defendant 
contends that the amount of the fine, although within the statutory· 
parameters, was excessive under the circumstances and disproportionate 
to the offense conmi.tted. 
In State vs. Nance, 438 P.2d 542(1968), the Utah S~preme 
Court discussed whether the length of a prison sentence was excessive 
or cruel and unusual but it would appear that the test therein set forth 
would be applicable to fines as well: 
"Our inquiry is limited to the question of whether the 
sentence imposed in proportion to ·the offense committed 
is such as to shuck the moral sense of all reasonable men 
as to what is right and proper under the circumstances. 
438 P.2d at 544. 
See also.State v. Teague, 336, P.2d 338, 340 (1959) 
The circumstances here show that neither of the victims of the 
assault or the Burglary incurred any permanent injuries or disfigurement 
nor did ei th.er of them require any medi ca 1 attentton or incur medical 
expenses. The defendant is deprived of hiS liberty for 5 years to life 
as well as suffering other disabilities imposed by law upon a convicted 
felon. The defendant is· impecunious as he qua 1 i fi ed for appointed counsel 
at trial and on appeal. He has no means by which he can reasonably be 
expected to pay the fine. In this sense, ,the Trial Court has imposed a 
condition on the defendant which borders on the edge of impossible to 
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perform and therefore shocks the moral sense. Defendant submits that 
there is a point of diminishing returns in sentencing and that the fine 
imposed will not accomplish any purpose which the ~rison sentence will not. 
POINT VI I 
THE VERDICT IS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE. 
Defendant 1 s theory of defense at trial was that the person who 
·entered the home of Sandra and Tammy Dotson on September 1, 1981 was 
someone other than the defendant • .- It is the contention of defendant that 
the jury __ verdict p 1 acing hi.m. in the home was in error and is not supported 
by the evidence given at trial.· 
Sandra Dotson, Tammy Dotson, and Edward McKinney all testified 
that the defendant was the assailant. (T. 18, 46, 91) Consider, however 
the evidence produced by defendant. that showed he ::was n_ot at the Dotson home 
at the time Of the offense. 
(a) Defe~dant's father produced and entered into evidence the 
page from his diary for September 1, 1981 which reflects that the defendant 
arrived home at 5:30 A.N. 
(b) The license number of the van seen leaving the Dotson 
residence was NV 5500 while the van of the defendant bore the license 
number NV 5301. (T. 71, 73, 74) 
(c) The assailant had a beard of about 1 1/2 months growth. 
(T. 91) However, the defendant approximately 30 minutes after the assault 
took place had no beard. See Exhibit No. 12 and also the testimony of 
Officer Holdaway at p. 128 of Transcript. 
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(d) Marilyn McKinney stated that the van which drove away 
from the Dotson home had a yellow front fender on the driver's side. 
(T. 174) Exhibits No .. 2 and 3 (photos of defendant 1 s van) .show that 
the defendant's van does no~ have a yellow front fender. 
(e) Sandy Dotson testified that she scratched_the assailant.:· 
(T.18) but Officer Holdaway said that he saw the defendant in the hude 
at 7:00 A.M. that morning but rroticed no scratches or bruises on him. 
(T. BT) 
-(f) Sandra Dotson did not notice the odor of alcohbl on the 
assailant although he at times was sitting on her. (T.37) The defendant 
however;~: had consumed approximately l 1/2 fifths of .whiskey in the.1·hours 
shortly before the assault and obviously would·have had an odor of an 
alcoholic beverage about him. (T.134). 
It is also significant to note that the identifications made 
by the three witnesses at the Dotson home were made in almost dark 
conditions and Ed McKinney and Tammy Dotson _,h(ld only seen the defendant ... •::, •. 
on one earli~r occasion. The testimony of Sandra Dotson is naturally 
·suspect fo~the- reason that she first thought the assailant was her 
boyfirend, Joe Gross, and then thought it might be her ex-husband, 
vJa 1 ter ·Dotson. Her credi bi 1 i ty is further weakened by the fact that she 
was taking prescription medications, e.g. Percodan, Valium, and Dalimane 
on the night of the incident. (T.35) 
Defendant contends that the verdict of the jury is not supported 
by the evidence in light of.the above. The testimon~ of the three witnesses 
is clo~ded with cbnsiderable difficulties affecting its weight whereas 
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that produced by the defendant is convincing that he was not present in 
the Dotson house when the attack occured. 
POINT VI II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING THE STATE TO· AMEND THE 
INFORMATION AFTER IT HAD RESTED ITS CASE. 
On the morni~g of the second day of trial and after the State 
· had rested the State moved the Court to amend the Information to state 
that in committing Aggravated Assault the defendant used 11 ~uch means 
or force ·1 ikely to produce death or serious bodily injury." (T.166) 
Defendant's objection (T. 166) ·was overruled and the motion was granted. 
(T. 167) 
Permitting the Infonnation to be amended on the last day of 
trial prejudiced the substantial rights of the defendant. Section 
77-35-4(d) Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended provides: 
The Court may permit an indictment or information 
to be am~nded at any time before verdict if no additional 
or different offense is charged and the substantial rights 
of the defendant are not prejudiced. 
Defendant acknowledges that no additional or different offense 
was charged by the a.mendment, but alleges that his substantial rights 
were prejudiced. The defendant came to trial prepared to defend against 
the claim that· he had caused "serious bodily injury 11 to Sandra Dotson 
and Tammy Dotson under subparagraph (a) of 76-5-103. The defendant did 
not come to trial prepared to defend against a claim that he used 
11 means or force likely to Pt:'Oduce death" under subparagraph (b) 
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of Section 76-5-103. By granting the State's Motion the burden was 
then placed on counsel to quickly obtain a medical expert· who could 
testify as to whether the conduct of the assailant presented a risk of 
causing death to the victim. 
-Counsel and defendant had previously gone through a Preliminary _ 
Hearing in which no attempt to show or claim-was.made that the means of 
force used were likely to produce death. Counsel ~should have been 
justified in relying upon the allegations contained in the Information 
on·which defendant wasbound,ov-er. It is not reasonable to.expect the 
defendant to come to trial· armed _.with witnesses to rebut and defend 
against possible new allegations o.r elements in the _offenses charged. 
Counse 1 cannot reasonably be expected to anti ci pate the .amendments 
which might be made by the State. The Trial Court by granting the 
Statejs motion placed a burden on defendant which was not anticipated 
and which deprived the defendant of his substantial rights. 
CONCLUSION 
The cumulative.effect of the errors and improprieties-committed 
at trial would justify this Honorable Court in reversing the verdict and 
judgment and the cause should be remanded back to the Trial Court for 
a new tri a 1 for the reasons set forth in the precedin-g, points. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Bryner 
690 E t Main Street 
P.O. Box 444 
Price, Utah 
Attorney for Appellant 
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